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Pessimists about the benefits and chances of reform can be found
everywhere.  In my view, whatever we believe about any particu-
lar system, we should all approach our democracy as reformers
and agents for change, especially lawyers, who take an oath to
uphold and improve the law.  While some sit back and praise
what we all believe to be the greatest government in the world,
others . . . continually focus on not what our democracy is, but
what it should be.1
I. THE VISION OF THE SYMPOSIUM
A. Introduction
What makes a good commission-based appointment system for
the selection of state court judges?2  This is an important question
because the models proposed by reformers and adopted by the
states should be the best available.  Through the presentations at
Fordham Law School on April 7, 2006 and the articles in this book,
the symposium sought to guide the reform of judicial selection sys-
tems by identifying the best approaches to appointing judges, ex-
isting or proposed.3  To paraphrase the introduction to this Article,
1. John D. Feerick, Why We Seek Reform, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3, 7 (2007).
The symposium was also described in Thomas F. Whelan, Symposium on the Best
Appointive System for the Selection of State Court Judges, SUFFOLK LAW., Apr. 2006,
at 24.  Justice Whelan is a Supreme Court Justice in Suffolk County, New York, and
attended the symposium.
2. This Article uses the term “commission-based” to describe the appointive sys-
tem where a commission provides a limited number of names from which an ap-
pointing authority must select.
3. See Steven Zeidman, Careful What You Wish For: Tough Questions, Honest
Answers, and Innovative Approaches to Appointive Judicial Selection, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 473, 475 (2007) [hereinafter Zeidman, Careful What You Wish For]  (“This
symposium invited the participants to move beyond the standard ‘election versus ap-
pointment’ debate.  Instead, all were urged to ‘critically appraise’ appointive selec-
tion—what exactly are the component parts of a gold standard appointive system?”).
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the symposium approached the subject as an agent for change.4
The subject is multi-disciplinary, so the symposium included a
number of panelists who are political scientists as well as lawyers,
law professors, and judges; because the subject involved various
states, the twenty participants came from fifteen different ones.
This Article will proceed in two parts.  First, it will set forth the
context of the symposium, including reflections on how judges are
being selected now through the elective process, the need for a bet-
ter approach to judicial selection, and the particular climate in New
York at the time of the symposium and thereafter.  The New York
discussion will focus on the district court and Second Circuit deci-
sions in Lopez Torres v. New York State Board of Elections, which
exposed and struck down as unconstitutional New York’s scheme
for selecting certain trial court judges, under which political party
leaders dictated judicial selection.5  Second, it will review the prin-
cipal topics and themes of the symposium, including highlights of
the presentations and articles of the participants on how a well-
constructed judicial appointment system should be designed.  To
quote one of the symposium’s panelists, “Embracing a judicial
nominating commission scheme is not enough.  Choosing the ap-
propriate paradigm is paramount.”6
B. The Context
1. Concerns About Elections
Reformers have long proposed the use of commission-based ap-
pointive systems as a cure for judicial selection problems, princi-
pally but not exclusively with elections.7  These problems include
improper incentives for elected judges to decide what might be
popular rather than decide the case upon the basis of the law and
the facts, and the ills of costly, nasty election campaigns.8  To the
4. Feerick, supra note 1, at 7. R
5. 411 F. Supp. 2d 212 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 462 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006), cert.
granted, 127 S. Ct. 1325 (2007).  The Supreme Court granted review of Lopez Torres
as this Article was going to print.
6. Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Judicial Nominating Commissions: Indepen-
dence, Accountability, and Public Support, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 73, 83 (2007).
7. See, e.g., Norman L. Greene, The Governor’s Power to Appoint Judges: New
York Should Have the Best Available Appointment System, 7 N.Y. ST. B.A. GOV’T L.
& POL’Y J. 46, 46 n.7 (2005) [hereinafter Greene, Governor’s Power] (listing organiza-
tions supporting independent judicial nominating commissions).
8. See COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, A.B.A., JUSTICE IN JEOP-
ARDY 1, 19 (2003) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY] (“[I]t is incumbents who are
put at future risk of losing their tenure when they uphold unpopular laws, invalidate
popular laws, or protect the rights of unpopular litigants.  In such cases, it is incum-
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extent that the public believes the negative things judicial candi-
dates say about each other while campaigning, this harms the jus-
tice system by undermining trust in the judiciary.9  Also, the need
to raise campaign funds, among other things, threatens the appear-
ance (or fact) of impartiality.  There have also been sham political
boss-controlled elevations of party favorites, where party loyalty or
service (past or anticipated), rather than competence or tempera-
ment, are at issue.10  “Political party leaders see the judiciary as a
way to promote and reward political party involvement.”11  Com-
bents who are thus presented with the impossible choice of sacrificing either their
careers or their independence and the rule of law.”); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J.
Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the
Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 816 (1995); see also Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Malignant Democracy: Core Fallacies Underlying Election of the Judiciary, 4
NEV. L.J. 35, 45 (2003) (“A judge may make eminently correct evidentiary rulings
only to be slandered by an opponent for protecting criminals or letting them out on
technicalities.”); Ann Woolner, Ask No Promises of These Political Candidates,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 1, 2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_en
&refer=home&sid=avGtpem_bVR4 (“For elected judges to keep their jobs, they
need to keep one eye on the law and the other on public opinion.”).
Other problems with elections include poorly informed voters. See Stempel, supra,
at 51 (“[J]udicial elections . . . force even our most conscientious voters to simply pull
voting booth levers at random or based on the most recent political sign viewed.”); see
also id. at 46 (“[M]ost voters participating in local judicial elections are largely shoot-
ing in the dark in casting their ballots.”).  Election campaigns by incumbent judges
also divert time and effort from the business of the court.
9. R. William Ide, a former president of the American Bar Association, ex-
plained to me how he came to oppose judicial elections.  He stated that it was in part
a matter of professionalism, public trust, and the image of judges.  He noted that
when judicial candidates ran negative campaigns, the public was likely to believe the
negative images, and their trust in judges declined significantly to the detriment of the
justice system.  E-mail from R. William Ide to author (Aug. 14, 2006, 09:39 EDT) (on
file with Fordham Urban Law Journal); see also Mark I. Harrison et al., On the Valid-
ity and Vitality of Arizona’s Judicial Merit Selection System: Past, Present, and Future,
34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 254 (2007) (“[C]andidates attack each other using sound-
bites or give the voters biased, laudatory self-assessments.  Elections rarely offer ob-
jective information, and certainly nothing that is actually tracked and quantified
. . . .”); Editorial, Judicial Politics Run Amok, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at A24
(arguing that unfair or misleading attack ads result in “diminished public respect and
confidence in judicial decision making no matter which candidates win . . .”); Tony
Mauro, Chief Justices Sound Alarm on Judicial Elections, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 23,
2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1156248911451 (quoting Indi-
ana Supreme Court Chief Justice Randall Shepard: “No good comes from fostering
judicial food fights at the ballot box”) (internal quotations omitted).
10. See Lopez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 411 F. Supp. 2d 212
(E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 462 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 1325 (2007).
See generally Becoming a Judge: Report on the Failings of Judicial Elections in New
York State, in GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM FOR THE 1990S: THE COLLECTED RE-
PORTS OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENTAL INTEGRITY 270
(Bruce A. Green ed., 1991) [hereinafter Becoming a Judge].
11. Feerick, supra note 1, at 7. R
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mission-based appointment systems are also recommended to re-
place systems where judges are appointed without commissions.12
Some “reform” politicians contend that they use “independent”
screening panels before selecting party favorites as nominees in an
elective process in an attempt to seek judicial quality.13  These
panels should not be confused with judicial nominating commis-
sions.  Political screening panels by their very nature can be unreli-
able guardians against the unqualified, bad-tempered, and
otherwise ill-suited candidates for judicial office.14  For example,
12. See generally infra Section II.A; Greene, Governor’s Power, supra note 7 (rec- R
ommending the use of a commission-based appointment system for New York’s inter-
mediate appellate court instead of the current system in which the governor
designates appellate court choices from the ranks of trial court judges without using a
judicial nominating commission).  Where judges are appointed without commissions,
one danger, among others, is that there are no structural restraints on the appointing
authority’s use of judgeships to reward political service as opposed to ability, even
where screening panels are used.
13. For a discussion of such political screening panels, see Report of the Task Force
on Judicial Selection of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Recommen-
dations on the Selection of Judges and the Improvement of the Judicial System in New
York, 58 REC. 374, 388 (2003) [hereinafter Task Force Recommendations].  Among
other things, at the time of the Task Force Recommendations, the screening panel in
Brooklyn, New York was described as having “few objective guidelines and proce-
dures, and appears to be subject to extensive influence from the party leader.” Id. at
389-90.  For recent New York County proposed reforms, see Daniel Wise, Plan to
Reform Screening Panels Gets High Marks, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 27, 2006, at 1; Press Release,
The Fund for Modern Courts, Modern Courts Hails Reform Plan for Selecting Judges
in New York State (Jan. 10, 2006), available at http://www.moderncourts.org/News/pr_
1_10_06.html.  Whether or not reforms have been put in place that remedy the objec-
tions set forth in the Task Force Recommendations or elsewhere is beyond the scope
of this Article.  Based on the decision in Lopez Torres, party leadership evidently
controlled New York’s state judicial selection apparatus, at least at the Supreme
Court level, regardless of screening.  The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York is also known as the New York City Bar Association.
14. These comments on panels are not meant to address bar association screening
of judicial candidates, which functions outside the political process, performs a sup-
plemental function during the judicial selection process, and may address both ap-
pointed and elected judicial candidates.  For the New York City Bar Association’s
establishment of its Committee on the Judiciary, see By-Laws of the New York City
Bar Association § XVII, ¶ 2, available at http://www.nycbar.org/AssociationGovern-
ance/bylaws.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2007) (“The Committee shall endeavor to se-
cure the nomination, election, certification, or appointment of qualified candidates, to
prevent the nomination, election, certification, or appointment of unqualified candi-
dates, and to prevent political considerations from outweighing fitness in the selection
of candidates for judicial office . . . .”).
Bar association screening is voluntary, however, and candidates may decline to par-
ticipate; disapproved candidates for elected judgeships may still run for office and
prevail despite their disapproval, and disapproved candidates may be appointed to
judgeships unless the appointing authority declines to do so.  Furthermore, bar associ-
ation screeners are unlikely to have access to the same array of information as would
be provided by established judicial performance evaluation programs, such as in Ari-
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such screening panels, lacking official sanction or sponsorship, are
not subject to published and enforceable rules and regulations.15
They need not hold public hearings or even operate openly.  The
public has no enforceable right to bring the unqualified to the at-
tention of these committees, no right to appear before the commit-
tees to make their position known personally, and no right to know
even when or where the committees meet so as to be able to bring
forward information.
Nor is the thoroughness of the investigation by these panels
known, let alone whether the investigators are trained in the pro-
cess.16  The public is not permitted to respond to the judge who is
interviewed before the committee, who answers pleasantly for the
short period of time of the interview (as virtually anyone can) to
dispel any concerns of the committee, and who dismisses the unfa-
vorable comments gathered by the committee as those of disgrun-
tled litigants.  All of these issues may be addressed in a well-
designed appointive system.
zona or Colorado.  These programs are discussed by panelists Mark Harrison and
Jean Dubofsky in their articles in this symposium issue.
15. More promising than political screening panels may be the Independent Judi-
cial Election Qualification Commissions to be set up in New York.  These commis-
sions were established by Part 150 of the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge of
the State of New York, available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/rules/chiefadmin/150.
shtml (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).  As noted in the preamble to Part 150:
[T]he public frequently is unaware of the qualifications of candidates who
run for judicial office, because the candidate-designation process often is not
conducted in public view.  The public will have greater confidence in the
judicial election process if they know that judicial candidates were screened
by independent screening panels and found to possess the qualities neces-
sary for effective judicial performance.
Id.  Independent, state-sponsored screening commissions were also recommended by
the Commission to Promote Public Confidence in Judicial Elections, popularly known
as the “Feerick Commission.” See COMM’N TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
17-22 (June 2004), available at http://law.fordham.edu/commission/judicialelections/
main.ihtml [hereinafter FEERICK COMMISSION REPORT]. The preamble’s statement
regarding the secrecy of the candidate designation process pre-dated the Second Cir-
cuit’s decision in Lopez Torres, which struck down a secretive process by party leaders
for selecting certain New York trial judges through a convention system. See gener-
ally 411 F. Supp. 2d 212.  Part 150 commissions, while promising, do not prevent the
unqualified from running in and even winning judicial elections.
16. These political screening committees lack a potent source of information on
judicial performance, unlike Arizona and Colorado, which provide judicial perform-
ance evaluations.  Even if the political screening committees might be otherwise well-
intentioned, the lack of useful information would necessarily hamper their
performance.
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2. “No Anomalous Political Mugging”: The Second Circuit’s
Decision in Lopez Torres v. New York
State Board of Elections
The best permanent solution . . . would be a merit-based ap-
pointment system that puts qualifications ahead of political con-
nections. . . .  The current system of choosing judges through
secret deals and old-fashioned cronyism corrodes the integrity
of the legal system and diminishes the courts.17
Nationally, the 2002 Supreme Court decision in Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White18 and ensuing decisions raised new concerns
over how judges are selected by expanding the permissible cam-
paign conduct of judicial candidates.19  As the Chief Justice of the
Minnesota Supreme Court recently observed, under White,
“[j]udicial candidates can now . . . announce their personal views
on disputed political, social and legal issues and, with some limits,
personally solicit contributions for their campaigns.”20  In her con-
curring opinion in White, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted that
if the states were unhappy with the implications of White, they
need not elect their judges.21  While the White case was already
generating discussion of judicial selection reform, another decision
issued just a few months before this symposium intensified the dia-
logue and gave the symposium a special context.
In January 2006, a federal district court in New York issued a
decision in Lopez Torres v. New York State Board of Elections,
which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in August
2006.  The court preliminarily enjoined New York’s convention sys-
tem for the selection of party nominees to be trial court judges
17. Editorial, Breaking Down the Clubhouse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2006, at A14
[hereinafter Breaking Down the Clubhouse] (commenting on the Second Circuit’s de-
cision in Lopez Torres).
18. 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
19. See Rachel Paine Caufield, In the Wake of White: How States are Responding
to Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and How Judicial Elections are Changing,
38 AKRON L. REV. 625, 625 (2005) [hereinafter Caufield, In the Wake of White]
(“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court fundamentally altered the landscape of state judicial
elections.”).
20. Russell A. Anderson, The State of the Judiciary, BENCH & B. MINN., Aug.
2006, at 20, 22; see also Editorial, Judicial Politics Run Amok, supra note 9 (“Recent R
court decisions have loosened restrictions on judicial campaigning without taking ade-
quate care to delineate reasonable ethical boundaries needed to preserve public trust
and the court’s special role as a neutral arbiter.”).
21. See White, 536 U.S. at 792 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“If the State has a prob-
lem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by contin-
uing the practice of popularly electing judges.”).
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known as “Supreme Court justices.”22  Unlike judges in any other
state, New York’s trial judges, designated “Supreme Court jus-
tices,”23 were nominated through a convention process, not
through partisan primaries or other means.24  At the convention,
delegates selected the party’s nominees for judgeships, and these
nominees appeared on the general election ballot.25  The Second
Circuit began its decision and framed the issue, stating “[t]his case
requires us to peer inside New York State’s political clubhouses
and determine whether party leaders have arrogated to themselves
22. See Lopez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 411 F. Supp. 2d 212, 214
(E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 462 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 1325 (2007).
The Supreme Court granted review of Lopez Torres as this Article was going to print.
See also Tom Perrotta, State Scheme to Select Judges Found to Violate Voter Rights,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 30, 2006, at 1.
23. The Second Circuit referred to New York’s use of the name “Supreme Court”
for its general jurisdiction trial court as “peculiar terminology,” since in every other
state that “might signify a member of the highest appellate court.” Lopez Torres, 462
F.3d at 171.  Only New York’s Supreme Court justices are eligible to be appointed to
New York’s intermediate appellate court known as the Appellate Division. N.Y.
CONST. art. VI, § 4(c); see also Greene, Governor’s Power, supra note 7, at 46.  Con- R
trol over the selection of Supreme Court justices therefore provides the party leader-
ship with indirect control over the selection of the membership of the Appellate
Division.
24. Lopez Torres, 462 F.3d at 172; see also Lopez Torres, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 215
(“New York is unique in its use of a convention system to select nominees to its trial
court of general jurisdiction” and “[t]he convention system at the heart of this case . . .
distinguishes New York from every other state . . . .”); Lopez Torres, 411 F. Supp. 2d
at 216 (“All other elected judges in New York State are nominated in a direct primary
election rather than in a judicial convention.”).  Although concerns have been raised
since Lopez Torres about the use of direct primaries for nominating candidates for
New York’s Supreme Court, the district court noted that the use of conventions, not
primaries, is what is exceptional in New York’s judicial selection scheme. Lopez
Torres, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 216.  Moreover, even where primaries have been available,
such as for the New York City Civil Court, some candidates have still run unopposed.
Lopez Torres did not address the role of political party leadership in the selection of
other judgeships in New York, because that was not the subject of the action.  Party
control, however, may extend in one form or another to those judgeships as well. See
Becoming a Judge, supra note 10, at 276 (focusing on Queens County and noting that R
the “Democratic county leader in Queens . . . and important district leaders . . . con-
trol access to positions on both the Supreme Court and the Civil Court”).
In his amicus brief, filed in the Second Circuit in Lopez Torres, former New York
City Mayor Edward Koch supported the use of primaries for the nomination of Su-
preme Court justices as an interim remedy. See Brief for Edward I. Koch as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellees at 13-14, Lopez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections,
462 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 06-0635) [hereinafter Koch Amicus Brief] (“The
parade of horribles appellants attribute to a primary system is ridiculous.  While I
believe that an appointive system using independent screening panels is the best way
to select all judges, there is nothing ‘undignified’ about elections, primary or general
. . . . Using them temporarily, until the legislature or the people find what they deem
to be the optimum solution, is appropriate.”).
25. Lopez Torres, 462 F.3d at 172.
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a choice that belongs to the people.”26  The Second Circuit found
that nomination in New York is typically tantamount to election,
and the New York nomination process is controlled by political
party leadership.27  The Second Circuit found, among other things,
that “[t]hrough a byzantine and onerous network of nominating
phase regulations employed in areas of one-party rule, New York
has transformed a de jure election into a de facto appointment [by
political party leadership].”28
The court concluded that the lead plaintiff’s frustration by
county party leadership for nomination to a trial court judgeship
was not an “anomalous political mugging.”29  “[O]ne-party rule is
the norm in most judicial districts,” and “the general election [for
26. Id. at 169.
27. See id. at 181 (citing a task force report noting that “[i]n practice it is the
political party leaders who have the decisive power to determine who will be nomi-
nated.  Most often this nomination is tantamount to election” and “[a]s we all
know . . . our system is only nominally one of election”) (internal quotations omitted).
The Second Circuit cited other supportive statements from commission reports, task
forces, and newspaper editorials, recognizing the control of political party leadership
over the judicial selection process. See id. at 199 (citing a commission finding that
“across the state, the system for selecting candidates for the Supreme Court vests
almost total control in the hands of local political leaders”); see also Becoming a
Judge, supra note 10, at 277 (“Political party control over judicial elections is most R
clearly revealed at the Supreme Court nominating convention.  The convention . . .
really operates as a rubber stamp of the county leader.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
Even before Lopez Torres, in testimony before the Commission to Promote Public
Confidence in Judicial Elections (popularly known as “the Feerick Commission”),
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg stated: “[P]arty judicial conventions,
where Supreme Court nominees are selected, are completely shrouded in secrecy with
absolutely no input from the electorate . . . . [T]he local clubhouse . . . should not be a
prerequisite for becoming a judge . . . and justice is much too important to be left to
the politicians.” See Press Release, The City of New York, Office of the Mayor,
Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg Delivers Testimony Before The Commission to Pro-
mote Public Confidence in Judicial Elections (Sept. 16, 2003), available at http://www.
nyc.gov/html/law/downloads/pdf/pr091603.pdf.
Kings County District Attorney Charles J. Hynes, in an amicus brief filed in the
Second Circuit in Lopez Torres, contended that “the principal function” of the judicial
conventions is to “give the deceptive appearance of legitimacy to the unilateral prior
determinations of Party leaders concerning who will fill an open seat on the bench of
the Supreme Court.”  Brief for Charles J. Hynes as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appel-
lees at 12, Lopez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006)
(No. 06-0635).  Former Mayor Koch, in his amicus brief, commented that the “con-
vention system of Supreme Court Justices [is] but ‘a show of democracy’ where
‘county leaders bargain with each other before they alone decide where the judge-
ships will go.’”  Koch Amicus Brief, supra note 24, at 2-3 (citing MARTIN TOLCHIN &
SUSAN TOLCHIN, TO THE VICTOR . . . : POLITICAL PATRONAGE FROM THE CLUB-
HOUSE TO THE WHITE HOUSE 136 (Vintage 1972)).
28. Lopez Torres, 462 F.3d at 200.
29. Id. at 181.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ103.txt unknown Seq: 10 12-APR-07 17:50
44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
the trial court judgeships] is little more than ceremony”30; a county
party leader admitted saying that he “‘surely’ can ‘kill’ any nomi-
nation and delegates [would] not “want[ ] to get me angry, so they
will not go against me until they have nothing to lose.”31  “[N]o one
wants to upset the county leader” since that “would jeopardize
one’s political future.”32  Since politics drove the process, some
candidates advanced to nomination in part because their husbands
were district political party leaders.33  A known “‘horrible’
choice—unqualified and temperamentally unfit for the bench,” was
not opposed at a convention for fear of offending the political
leader who desired the candidate.34  In the case of the lead plain-
tiff, the party leaders refused to support her nomination for a Su-
preme Court judgeship because she refused to hire the leader’s
favored candidate for an important position as her law secretary
while she served as a Civil Court judge.35  Such political domina-
tion of the process was all too common.
30. Id. at 178.
31. Id. at 198.
32. Id. at 199.
33. Id. at 200.
34. Id. at 178.  The finding that the party put a known ill-tempered candidate on
the bench for political reasons should not pass unnoticed.  Anointing such a candidate
or reselecting an ill-tempered incumbent are gross abuses of the public trust which
may be addressed administratively through the appropriate office of court administra-
tion, administrative judge, or commission on judicial conduct. See generally Norman
L. Greene, A Perspective on Temper in the Court: A Forum on Judicial Civility, 23
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709 (1996); Jeffrey D. Jackson, Beyond Quality: First Principles
in Judicial Selection and Their Application to a Commission-Based Selection System,
34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 125 (2007); Daniel Wise, Lawyers Discuss What to Do About
Rudeness of Judges, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 30, 1995, at 1.  At this symposium, Nebraska Court
of Appeals Judge John Irwin considered the importance of judicial temperament for
Nebraska’s performance review process for judges.  He said that “judges ‘can be
dumb as a bucket of hair’ but if they are nice to people in court,” they will be ap-
proved.  Whelan, supra note 1, at 24.  A good example of judicial intemperance ap-
pears in Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
2006, at 31 (quoting an attorney: “[w]hen [the judge is] mad, first his face gets red . . . .
Then his neck gets red and he starts tucking his chin down into his chest.  If he tears
off his glasses, I don’t care what side you’re on, you had better drop to the floor and
get under that table fast”).
35. Lopez Torres, 462 F.3d at 178-79.  The plaintiff had interviewed the party-fa-
vored candidate for a position as a law secretary, but she was told by the applicant’s
prior employer that his work was “‘mediocre’ and that ‘he had spent an enormous
amount of time on the phone doing political work.’” Id. at 179.  Although party lead-
ership had a practice of using the position of law secretary as a way to reward political
service, the Second Circuit found that “the position of a law secretary is a significant
one” with important tasks to perform, including legal research, assisting in drafting
opinions and orders, and holding conferences with attorneys. Id. at 178.
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The district court’s decision was recognized as having an “incred-
ible impact”36 and having “shook the judiciary,” and sparked ex-
tensive controversy and analysis.  This included renewed calls for
and efforts at reform from bar leadership37 and the press.38  The
New York Times stated that “[t]he myth that New Yorkers choose
their top trial judges by democratic election was exploded last
week by a 77-page federal court decision striking down the club-
house-controlled selection process for violating the rights of candi-
dates and voters.”39  The Times called the stricken convention
system “hack-infested” and stated that it was “undermining the
quality of the state’s judiciary”; it added that “clubhouse politicians
award positions on the state’s top trial bench as if they were low-
level patronage jobs.”40  After the Second Circuit’s decision, a
36. Feerick, supra note 1, at 11. R
37. The New York County Lawyers’ Association (NYCLA) devoted the lead story
in its March 2006 newsletter New York County Lawyer to the Lopez Torres case. See
10 Days that Shook the Judiciary, N.Y. COUNTY LAW., Mar. 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications224_0.pdf [hereinafter 10
Days].  The title is dramatic but fair.  NYCLA’s then-president Norman L. Reimer
urged “New York’s lawyers and judges” not to “squander this chance to shape the
contours of reform.”  Norman L. Reimer, Judicial Selection: Crisis and Opportunity,
N.Y. COUNTY LAW., Mar. 2006, at 5.  According to Mr. Reimer, “[c]ircumstances have
combined to present a rare opportunity for meaningful reform.  We should not flinch
or finesse nor allow a banal absorption with the status quo to impede our will to
lead.” Id.  Mr. Reimer “reaffirmed NYCLA’s long standing support for a merit-based
appointment system.” 10 Days, supra, at 17.  Consistent with this symposium, Mr.
Reimer also recommended considering “an optimum appointive system,” taking ac-
count of “national experience.” Reimer, supra, at 5; see also N.Y. COUNTY LAWYERS’
ASS’N, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN NEW YORK STATE: A ROADMAP TO REFORM (May 8,
2006), available at http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications248_0.pdf
[hereinafter ROADMAP TO REFORM].  “While the bar has many worthwhile causes to
promote, in the years to come, can there be any more important cause to include
among them than judicial selection reform?”  Feerick, supra note 1, at 12. R
38. The New York Daily News, in an editorial following the Second Circuit oral
argument but before the decision in Lopez Torres, wrote that “the bosses exert dicta-
torial control over who gets on the bench in New York through their rigged judicial
nominating conventions. In this matter, boss rule is absolute . . . .”  Editorial, The
Party’s Over for Dictator Bosses, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 8, 2006, at 40.  The New
York Post called the District Court’s decision “scathing” and a “stunning victory [for]
reformers” and referred to the judicial selection process for New York’s Supreme
Court justices as “tainted with cronyism and corruption” and “sham.”  David Seifman
& Zach Haberman, Party’s Over for Rigged Judge Elex, N.Y. POST, Jan. 28, 2006, at 2.
39. Editorial, A Turning Point for New York Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2006, at
A12 [hereinafter Turning Point].
40. Id.  Indeed, using judgeships as a reward for political service is a poor use of
these offices.  The states require judges of high quality, and political services have
nothing whatsoever to do with that calculus. See Becoming a Judge, supra note 10, at R
293 (“As our investigation shows, political parties are geared to reward loyalty, not
merit; to discourage, not encourage, independence and diversity; and to obtain power
rather than promote justice.  Such goals, however valuable to the operation of the
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Times editorial added: “Judges ascend to the bench as a result of
loyal work for the party or friendship with a political power bro-
ker . . . . [They] are chosen at judicial conventions whose delegates
are generally handpicked by party bosses . . . [in a] backroom pro-
cess [ ] fueled by political quid pro quos.”41  The Times called for
appointment rather than election of judges.42
Although the decision in Lopez Torres was a bellwether event
that should engender important reform, commentators have had
different views on the reforms they seek for addressing the
problems identified by the Second Circuit.43  The Times cautioned
party system in general, have no place in the selection of our judges.”); see also
Seifman & Haberman, supra note 38 (quoting a political consultant: “Supreme Court R
justice is the highest position that political leaders in many areas have almost unlim-
ited power to bestow on people . . . . Now, that’s gone”).  There is an analogue in the
19th century for what has transpired in New York. See Kurt E. Scheuerman, Rethink-
ing Judicial Elections, 72 OR. L. REV. 459, 466 (1993) (“The innovation of electing
judges soon proved to contain its share of problems.  Political machines began to con-
trol the selection of judges through the nomination process, and elections became
rubber stamps of the machine’s selections.  This led to the creation of a politically
responsive, yet at times incompetent, judiciary.”) (citations omitted).
41. Breaking Down the Clubhouse, supra note 17. R
42. The New York Times noted that judicial elections should be scrapped “in favor
of a new merit selection system for the Supreme Court.” Turning Point, supra note
39.  The New York Daily News has likewise endorsed appointive selection. See Rich- R
ard Schwartz, Chief Judge’s Reform Efforts Just Go Bust, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 9,
2003, at 41 (describing the “best solution—merit appointment of judges by the gover-
nor with the state Legislature’s approval”).
43. See Daniel Wise, Second Circuit Rejects Judicial Conventions, N.Y.L.J., Aug.
31, 2006, at 1 [hereinafter Wise, Second Circuit] (describing the various viewpoints of
The Fund for Modern Courts, the Brooklyn District Attorney, and the New York
State Bar Association, including the Fund chairperson’s suggestion that conventions
be improved, the District Attorney’s position that the convention system be abol-
ished, and the New York State Bar Association president’s statement “‘let’s imple-
ment real reform, and merit selection is real reform’”); see also E-mail from James
Sample, Associate Counsel, Brennan Center for Justice, to author (Sept. 10, 2006,
11:48 EDT) (on file with Fordham Urban Law Journal) (warning of the potential
consequences of making inadequate reforms to remedy the deficiencies identified in
Lopez Torres: “[W]e must also vigilantly guard against the pendulum swinging too far
in the direction of the status quo where constitutional rights are at stake . . . . Let us
also be careful not to let the overly-incremental become the ally of the
unconstitutional”).
Brooklyn District Attorney Charles Hynes, the New York State Bar Association,
and The Fund for Modern Courts all support appointive selection as a replacement
for the system of judicial elections. See Celeste Katz, DA’s New Judge-ment Call Jus-
tices Should Be Appointed: Hynes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 26, 2005, at 3; Daniel Wise,
Hynes, Coalition Push for Appointment of Judges, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 2005, at 1; The
Fund for Modern Courts, About The Fund for Modern Courts, http://www.modern
courts.org/About_Us/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2007) (“From the day of our
founding, we have fought to remove the influence of money and politics from the
selection process by working to institute merit selection.”).  For the New York State
Bar Association’s reports supporting appointive selection, see infra note 47.  The fact R
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against an effort “to make only small changes” and stated “[m]inor
tinkering will not be enough to cure the constitutional flaws.”44
3. Designing the Alternative
The symposium drew attention to the subject of appointive selec-
tion, a subject that has not been discussed recently on this scale.45
To the extent that this reflects inattention, this may have resulted
from scholarly indifference, pessimism, and an ill-founded belief
that the answer is already known.46  Bar associations, such as the
American Bar Association, the New York State Bar Association,
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, and the New
York County Lawyers’ Association, continued to recommend com-
mission-based appointment systems through their publications or
that various organizations profess to support appointive selection does not necessarily
mean that they support the same kind of appointive system or that each system is of
equal quality or worthy of support.
44. Breaking Down the Clubhouse, supra note 17.  Some have called for funda- R
mental rather than incremental change. See Wise, Second Circuit, supra note 43 R
(quoting New York State Bar Association president Mark Alcott); Norman L.
Greene, Letter to the Editor, New York’s Judge System, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2006, at
A14 (recommending seeking “a well-designed appointive system to avoid having to
reform the system repeatedly and in order to bring New Yorkers now the system that
they deserve”).  According to Lopez Torres, the convention system is unique to New
York (and even within New York) for selecting judicial nominees and has poorly
served New Yorkers.  Lopez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 411 F. Supp. 2d
212, 215-16 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 462 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 1325
(2007).  It is therefore unclear what may be gained by attempting to “improve” that
flawed system (even if possible), rather than eliminating it and moving forward with
more promising reforms.
Seeking inadequate judicial selection reforms where substantial changes are needed
has been analogized to “putting lipstick on a pig.”  Ryan L. Souders, A Gorilla at the
Dinner Table: Partisan Judicial Elections in the United States, 25 REV. LITIG. 529, 567
(2006).
45. The proper design of appointive systems has been the subject of recent arti-
cles, however, such as the author’s articles for the Mercer Law Review and Albany
Law Review.  Norman L. Greene, Perspectives on Judicial Selection, 56 MERCER L.
REV. 949, 959 (2005) [hereinafter Greene, Perspectives]; Norman L. Greene, Perspec-
tives on Judicial Selection Reform: The Need to Develop a Model Appointive Selection
Plan for Judges in Light of Experience, 68 ALB. L. REV. 597, 602 (2005) [hereinafter
Greene, Model Appointive Selection Plan].  Professor Steven Zeidman, a symposium
participant, also squarely addressed the design of appointive systems in Steven
Zeidman, To Elect or Not to Elect: A Case Study of Judicial Selection in New York City
1977-2002, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 831 (2004) [hereinafter Zeidman, To Elect]
(“What, then, should a model merit selection process look like?  What are the compo-
nent parts of an ideal system of merit selection?”).
46. See Greene, Model Appointive Selection Plan, supra note 45, at 607-08; see also R
Feerick, supra note 1, at 7 (commenting on the problem of pessimism).  In addition, R
some have challenged the quality of certain appointment systems and argued that
because there is no good or perfect system, attempts at change are futile. See Greene,
Perspectives, supra note 45, at 961. R
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reports.47  Reformers might have from time to time articulated the
word “appointments” as an alternative to elections and might have
even mentioned the Missouri Plan and similar approaches.48  But
few were asking how one should design a good appointive system,
let alone which were the best models to follow.49
Although such plans were innovative and progressive when orig-
inally enacted, more may be done today than merely following the
classic examples.  Commission-based appointive plans were devel-
oped in the early part of the twentieth century and were most nota-
bly advocated by the American Judicature Society—one of the
symposium’s sponsors—which became (and remains) one of the
nation’s most prestigious court reform organizations.  In 1940, the
first plan was adopted in Missouri (and therefore called the Mis-
souri Plan).  It involved commission-based appointment of judges
with a retention election at the conclusion of the judge’s term with
the subject of the election being essentially one question: shall this
judge be retained or not?50  Commission-based plans were subse-
47. See, e.g., JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 8; ACTION UNIT NO. 4, N.Y. STATE R
BAR ASS’N, A MODEL PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTING THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSO-
CIATION’S PRINCIPLES FOR SELECTING JUDGES (1993), available at http://www.nysba.
org/Content/NavigationMenu/Attorney_Resources/Legislation/NYSBA_Model_Plan
_for_selecting_judges.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2007); REPORT OF ACTION UNIT NO. 4
(COURT REORGANIZATION) TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES ON TRIAL COURT
MERGER AND JUDICIAL SELECTION (1979) (on file with Fordham Urban Law Jour-
nal); ROADMAP TO REFORM, supra note 37; Task Force Recommendations, supra note R
13. ROADMAP TO REFORM was the product of the New York County Lawyers’ Asso- R
ciation task force on judicial selection; the author was a member of the task force and
co-chair of the subcommittee on appointive selection.  Some members of the task
force attended the symposium, and the report specifically acknowledged the work of
symposium participant Jeffrey Jackson. See ROADMAP TO REFORM, supra note 37, at
7.
48. For a summarized history of the development of appointive selection in the
United States in the 20th century, including the Missouri Plan, see Caufield, In the
Wake of White, supra note 19, at 627-28; see also Stempel, supra note 8, at 44 R
(“[E]lection of judges is not required by democratic theory, democratic norms, Amer-
ican History, or a functional analysis of judicial role.  Appointment of the bench is
thus perfectly consistent with both historical and modern democratic norms.”).
49. Symposium sponsors—the American Judicature Society, The Fund for Mod-
ern Courts, and the League of Women Voters (through its Education Foundation)—
and Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts have persisted with efforts in favor of com-
mission-based appointments.  One member of the American Judicature Society,
Rachel Paine Caufield, and two members of Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts, Lynn
Marks and Shira Goodman, participated in this symposium.
50. See Caufield, In the Wake of White, supra note 19, at 628 n.19 (“The merit R
selection plan is commonly referred to as the Missouri Plan because Missouri was the
first to adopt the plan in 1940.”).  Missouri nonetheless still elects some of its judges.
Id.
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quently adopted in other states.51  Updates in those plans are
needed, however, to reflect the passage of time, lessons learned
from experience, and changes in values, including values favoring
openness in government and diversity.52
The use of the word “design” does not necessarily mean in-
venting new systems.  Rather a state might adopt aspects of sys-
tems that are working well in other states.  For example, system
designers should know if New Mexico or Arizona has solved the
problem of ensuring that diversity be considered in its system of
judicial selection;53 if Alaska has successfully addressed how to
51. See id. at 628 & n.23.
52. Many have historically called the commission-based system “merit selection.”
Although some find value in the phrase, others have commented that it criticizes
elected judges, unnecessarily so, as lacking in quality.  Whether elected judges are
more qualified than appointed judges is beyond the scope of this symposium.  Resolv-
ing the quality issue for judges who are elected as opposed to appointed might require
another symposium in order to determine what are the characteristics of judicial qual-
ity and how they apply to each individual judge. See Rachel Paine Caufield, How the
Pickers Pick: Finding a Set of Best Practices for Judicial Nominating Commissions, 34
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163, 174 (2007) [hereinafter Caufield, Best Practices] (“[T]he
claim that commission-based appointment produces the highest quality judges is noto-
riously difficult to evaluate because ‘quality’ is so ill-defined . . . . It is also worth
noting that highly qualified candidates may prefer commission-based appointment be-
cause they are unwilling or unable to raise the money to run an effective campaign in
an elective system.”); see also Jackson, supra note 34, at 126 (“Initially, there is the R
problem of reaching agreement on what attributes make someone a qualified judge.
While it might be possible to agree on some general attributes, it is difficult to quan-
tify them in any one individual . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
Shira Goodman and Lynn Marks argued for the continued use of the term “merit
selection,” based in part on the positive reaction of Pennsylvania focus groups who
find it appealing. See Shira J. Goodman & Lynn A. Marks, A View from the Ground:
A Reform Group’s Perspective on the Ongoing Effort to Achieve Merit Selection of
Judges, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 425, 425 n.2 (2007).  One may not lightly challenge
their expertise on what is most likely to work in their state.  But others (in New York,
for example) have found the phrase offensive.  New York reformers, attempting to
build or advance a reform movement, may wish to alienate as few as possible.  Sup-
porters of appointive selection are sufficiently busy without fighting skirmishes over
terminology.  Reformers must select the terminology that they believe works best for
them and be sensitive to cultural differences between states.
Nevertheless, others might contend that after the decision in Lopez Torres, the
term “merit selection” should be reborn to describe a process where such political
maneuvering is left behind.  By any fair interpretation of the words, the system de-
scribed in Lopez Torres seemed to be the opposite of “merit selection.”  Rather, the
controlling factor appeared to be the will of the political leadership who had their
own political priorities in mind in seeking to determine the results of elections. See
generally Lopez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006),
cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 1325 (2007).  This makes it perfectly understandable why some
have wished to use the term “merit selection” to describe the alternative of selecting
judges through appointments, rather than through elections.
53. See infra Section II.H.
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avoid control of the judicial nominating commission by appointing
authorities;54 if Colorado or Arizona has determined how best to
evaluate judges seeking reselection;55 if Hawaii or the District of
Columbia has a creative system for determining whether judges
should be retained for another term which has been working well;56
if Massachusetts has a good code of conduct for judicial nominat-
ing commissioners;57 if another country requires certain education
or testing before a judge is permitted to take office;58 or if some
proposal has been made that has a solution for providing oversight
over judicial nominating commissioners or for preserving the inde-
pendence of the commission.59  The symposium may also result in
identifying improvements which should be used for states with ex-
isting commission-based appointive plans, not just for states which
elect judges.60
Through research into the literature of judicial selection, per-
sonal experience, and contacts, I was able to recruit a distinguished
faculty.  Some were reformers already involved in designing ap-
pointive systems, others had addressed the subject in their scholar-
ship, others were prepared to expand their studies, and still others
even had direct experience with appointive selection in their own
states.61  Some panelists were appointed as judges, others served on
54. See infra Section II.B.
55. See infra Section II.K.
56. See infra Section II.J.
57. See Mass. Exec. Order No. 470 (2006), available at http://www.mass.gov/jnc/
JNC%20-%20Executive%20Order%20470%20(02.03.2006).pdf.
58. See infra Section II.L.
59. One such proposal for preserving commission independence was contained in
a 1989 bill, which was unsuccessful in Missouri but provides a useful model.  That bill
“would have prohibited the governor from communicating directly or indirectly with
members of the nominating commission until the nominees for a judicial vacancy
were submitted to the governor.” Am. Judicature Soc’y, Missouri Judicial Selection,
http://www.ajs.org/js/MO_history.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).  This proposal mir-
rors the author’s recent proposal for limiting communication between the appointing
authority and the commission. See Greene, Perspectives, supra note 45, at 964. R
60. See Marilyn S. Kite, Wyoming’s Judicial Selection Process: Is It Getting the Job
Done?, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 203, 204 (2007) (noting that the purpose of her sym-
posium article “is to explain Wyoming’s commission-based judicial selection process,
study how it has performed over the years, see what lessons we can from that history,
and consider how it can be improved”).
61. One focus of Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts is the development and adop-
tion of appointive selection plans, which the organization has studied in depth. See
Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts, Judicial Selection, http://www.pmconline.org/in-
dexjs.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).  Professor John Feerick, during his many years
of involvement in judicial selection reform, chaired a commission that embraced ap-
pointive selection in the late 1980s, and outlined elements of a commission-based
plan. See Becoming a Judge, supra note 10, at 293, 295-301.  Moreover, Professor R
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relevant judicial selection or evaluation commissions, and still
others were keen observers of the process.  The symposium in-
cluded speakers from states including Arizona, Colorado, Kansas,
Nebraska, New York, and Wyoming, where judges are appointed
to full terms in some or all courts. Valuable experience is not lim-
ited to those from states where all judges are appointed to full
terms, of course; even states which appoint judges only for vacan-
cies may have such experience.62
Finally, since this symposium focused on what makes a good ap-
pointive system, it avoided discussing whether contested elections
are better than appointive systems or any flaws in elective sys-
tems.63  In a sense, it was the reverse of a distinguished New York
commission which considered how to improve judicial elections,
and consistent with its limited mandate, did not consider appoint-
ments.64  A number of panelists at the symposium, however, still
covered retention elections, which often form a part of appointive
systems.
II. THE SYMPOSIUM
In the following sections, I will attempt to bring together many
of the important themes which were developed in the symposium.
My reference points are the articles produced for the symposium.
A. The Importance of Judicial Appointments
Throughout the United States
The subject of appointing judges and improving the way of doing
so is important even where states elect judges.  Although some
states appoint all of their judges and some appoint only their appel-
Steven Zeidman addressed the precise subject of the symposium in a recent article.
See generally Zeidman, To Elect, supra note 45.  Through her connection with the R
American Judicature Society and her own scholarship, Rachel Paine Caufield has also
long been involved with appointive systems.  Of course, here our issue was not neces-
sarily adopting any past models of appointive selection but improving them or creat-
ing new ones.
62. Asking states that have used commission-based appointments about their own
plans is eminently reasonable.  The states that use commission-based appointments
should be aware of what works well and what improvements and refinements are
required.  Moreover, even states with a widely-admired plan, such as Arizona and
Colorado, can provide information on how a good plan can be made better.
63. This Article considers elections principally to provide context to the discussion
of judicial selection by appointment. See supra Section I.B.
64. See FEERICK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 11.  An earlier commis- R
sion chaired by Professor John Feerick studied judicial elections and, having a differ-
ent mandate, recommended a commission-based appointment system to select judges.
See Becoming a Judge, supra note 10, at 299-301. R
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late judges, states that elect judges may still appoint them to fill
vacancies.  Filling vacancies is important, not only because these
appointees often serve as judges for significant periods of time, but
also because they run with the advantage of incumbency and may
use that prestige to become elected.65  One panelist commented
that even in states where judges are elected, most “originally take
the bench by appointment.”66  Appointment is also the speediest
way to fill vacancies and prevent disruption of court business.67
B. The Principal Modes of Appointment
There are several common appointive systems, other than com-
mission-based systems.  First, there is direct appointment by a gov-
ernor or by some other appointing authority, such as a legislature.
Direct appointment means that the authority has a free hand to
pick whoever it wants, subject to any legal experience or age re-
quirements for judges.  Sometimes the appointing authority uses a
screening committee (such as in the designation of justices for the
New York State Appellate Division by the governor),68 sometimes
the appointing authority does not.69  The screening panel may ad-
vise the authority on who it views as qualified, but the authority
need not select from the approved picks.  “Absent a commis-
sion . . . appointing authorities may appoint individuals [to judge-
ships] more for their politics than their ability . . . . [The appointing
authority when a governor] particularly focus[es] on those who
have helped the governor or the governor’s party or allies.”70  Vir-
65. See Harrison et al., supra note 9, at 241, 258 (describing how incumbents have R
advantages over other challengers); see also Greene, Governor’s Power, supra note 7, R
at 52 n.41 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-104 (West 2005)) (restricting the ability of
appointed judges to run as incumbents for certain judicial office while holding such
office); Rob Moritz, Bill on Judicial Elections Approved, ARK. NEWS BUREAU, Mar.
19, 2005, available at http://www.arkansasnews.com/archive/2005/03/19/News/318955.
html (discussing Arkansas bill prior to its passage).
66. Colquitt, supra note 6, at 77; accord Scheuerman, supra note 40, at 476. R
67. Colquitt, supra note 6, at 77. R
68. Greene, Governor’s Power, supra note 7, at 47 (discussing the Governor’s ap- R
pointments of New York State Appellate Division justices and other judges and mak-
ing suggestions for improvement in their selection process); see also Zeidman, To
Elect, supra note 45, at 801 (describing the New York Governor’s use of screening R
commissions).
69. See Zeidman, To Elect, supra note 45, at 799  (“Executive appointment, R
whereby an elected official, typically the Governor, wields unfettered power with no
formal input from any source, is . . . rare.”).
70. See Colquitt, supra note 6, at 77-78.  The federal system involves direct presi- R
dential appointments and legislative confirmation, without a commission.  The sympo-
sium, however, did not address reforming federal judicial selection.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ103.txt unknown Seq: 19 12-APR-07 17:50
2007] WHAT MAKES A GOOD APPOINTIVE SYSTEM? 53
tually no reformer ever recommends a direct appointment system
for state judiciaries.
The most commonly recommended reform involves the use of a
judicial nominating commission, independent of the appointing au-
thority, which recommends a small group of candidates from whom
the appointing authority must select the judge.  The commission
has a screening function, but it also has a limiting function: the au-
thority must select from the persons proposed by the judicial nomi-
nating commission.71  It may not request additional names, except
in what one panelist called a “weak-commission” system;72 and it
cannot select off the list.73  Sometimes the authority selects some
members of the nominating commission, although that is not typi-
cally recommended.74  Where the appointing authority, such as a
governor, selects commissioners, as one panelist noted, the system
“reeks of redundancy and inefficiency” because “the governor ac-
tually controls the commission.”75
71. See Zeidman, To Elect, supra note 45, at 799 (“The requirement that the ap- R
pointment be made from the short list provided to the appointing authority is a distin-
guishing feature of a bona fide merit selection system.”).  The system presumes that
all of those listed by the judicial nominating commission are qualified, and it should
not matter from the standpoint of quality who the appointing authority selects. See
Harrison et al., supra note 9, at 252  (“Because the [judicial nominating commission] R
has completed an exhaustive inquiry, however, the governor presumably ‘can have a
blindfold on, she could reach into the jar, and she could pull out a name, and whoever
she pulls out would serve on the court ably.’”).
72. Colquitt, supra note 6, at 113.  Professor Tarr noted that states might consider R
the federal appointment system which has no judicial nominating commission but re-
quires senate confirmation; however, he did not necessarily advocate that they do so.
See G. Alan Tarr, Designing an Appointive System: The Key Issues, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 291, 304-06 (2007).
73. Professor Tarr noted that Delaware’s judicial nominating commission may
submit as few as three candidates to the governor but allows the governor to request
another list of at least three names if she finds the first list unsatisfactory.  Tarr, supra
note 72, at 310.  Delaware’s procedures were established by an Executive Order of R
the Governor. See Del. Exec. Order No. 4, available at http://www.state.de.us/gover-
nor/orders/eo_4.shtml#TopOfPage (last visited Feb. 11, 2007) (“The Governor may
refuse to nominate a person from the list submitted and may require the Commission,
within thirty days, to submit a supplementary list of no fewer than three other quali-
fied persons willing to accept the office, subject to the same provisions governing the
original list.  The Governor may then nominate a person from the original or the
supplementary list.”); see also Am. Judicature Soc’y, Current Methods of Judicial Se-
lection (Delaware), http://www.ajs.org/js/DE_methods.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
74. Greene, Model Appointive Selection Plan, supra note 45, at 605. R
75. Colquitt, supra note 6, at 87.  The governor’s selection of a substantial number R
of commissioners may create the impression, if not the fact, of the governor’s control.
The danger may be lessened if there are structural safeguards to avoid such an ap-
pearance, such as limiting the number of selections by the governor, and restricting
communications between the governor and the judicial nominating commissioners.
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Some have assumed that if a state wishes to adopt a commission-
based appointive plan, there are a limited number of options from
which to choose.  As this symposium demonstrates, that assump-
tion is wrong: “It is important to note that there is no one merit
selection system.”76  According to one panelist, “there are nearly as
many variations on the merit selection plan as there are states that
use a commission-based appointment system.”77  Although com-
mission-based plans have common elements,78 the plans may in-
volve multiple variations requiring important policy choices.
Indeed, if someone advocates an appointive system without provid-
ing detail (and detail is the subject of the symposium), one may not
be sure whether she should support the system79 without more
See Greene, Perspectives, supra note 45, at 964; Am. Judicature Soc’y, Missouri Judi- R
cial Selection, http://www.ajs.org/js/MO_history.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
76. Caufield, Best Practices, supra note 52, at 171. R
77. Id.
78. See id. (“What they all share, however, is the use of an independent (and usu-
ally bipartisan) commission that is established to evaluate applicants for the bench
and make recommendations to the appointing authority.”).  Comparing all the ex-
isting and possible variations in the plans is beyond the scope of the Article.  One
consideration, however, is how much weight (if any) should be given by the judicial
nominating commission to the appointing authority’s predilections.  Professor Tarr
stated that the commission should consider the appointing authority’s views.  Tarr,
supra note 72, at 302 (“[G]overnors tend to choose members of their own party as R
judges, so commissions should not send to them slates of potential candidates that
include no members of the governor’s party.”).  On the other hand, the Alaska Judi-
cial Council states that the judicial nominating commission should not consider the
likelihood of the applicant’s appointment by the appointing authority. See Proce-
dures for Nominating Judicial Candidates of Alaska Judicial Council, http://www.ajc.
state.ak.us/selection/procedur.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007) (“The Council does not
consider an applicant’s likelihood of appointment by the governor.”).
The Alaska position appears to be correct.  The purpose of the judicial nominating
commission is to ensure that the best qualified candidates emerge as nominees, not
those who are the most politically palatable to the governor.  Considering the gover-
nor’s preferences merely because they are her preferences would defeat at least one
purpose of the commission.  Furthermore, selecting the governor’s known favorite
would diminish the candidacies of the others and render them illusory, because they
would never have had a realistic chance to be selected.  This may also result in a drop
in applications from candidates with strong credentials and who might make excellent
judges, but have weak ties to the governor.  To include the governor’s favored candi-
dates as a matter of policy, moreover, would create cynicism about the fairness of the
process. See Task Force Recommendations, supra note 13, at 400. R
79. See Goodman & Marks, supra note 52, at 437.  Shira Goodman and Lynn
Marks noted:
Experts in polling, public research, and public relations advise reformers,
such as [Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts], to talk generally about the
need to employ a system that better assures qualified judges, to focus on the
broader issues, and to avoid getting bogged down in the details and mechan-
ics of how the merit selection system would operate.  The problem is that
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information beyond the descriptive title.80
C. The Need for Public Education on the Role of the Judiciary
The panelists agreed that education of the public on the role of
judges is essential to the proper functioning of the judicial system.
“[O]ur most important agent for change is education.”81  “[There
is] widespread and basic misunderstanding about the role and func-
tion of judges in our society . . . . [Some citizens] mistakenly believe
that judges should be ideologically accountable to the electorate
like members of the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment.”82  But judges are not supposed to decide cases to suit popu-
lar demand, but rather on the law, and this must be explained to
everyone . . . wants to know [for example] who will be appointing members
of the nominating commission . . . .
Id.
80. Many conversations or debates about appointment systems proceed without
any description of which appointment system is at issue.  For example, during a recent
panel discussion on judicial independence and judicial selection, a co-panelist gener-
ally attacked “my appointive plans,” without explaining to the audience which plan he
was attacking (presumably leaving that to the audience’s imagination) and without
hearing my explanation of the plan.  I replied that he did not know which appointive
plan I was suggesting before he attacked it and there were a number of “appointive
plans”—not just one.
81. Feerick, supra note 1, at 12. R
82. Harrison et al., supra note 9, at 262; see also Hon. John F. Irwin & Daniel L.
Real, Enriching Judicial Independence: Seeking to Improve the Retention Vote Phase
of an Appointive Selection System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 453, 463-66 (2007).  The
importance of public education was also acknowledged by a group of chief justices.
Mauro, supra note 9 (“The nation’s state chief justices are launching a campaign to R
remind voters of what used to be obvious: Judicial elections are different from those
for other offices.”).  A good example of this public understanding of judges as ordi-
nary politicians appeared in a 2006 Montana ballot issue.  A new provision would
have instituted recall proceedings against a judge upon a petition, among other things,
containing a statement alleging “electoral dissatisfaction”: “The justification state-
ment is sufficient if it sets forth any reason acknowledging electoral dissatisfaction
with a justice or judge notwithstanding good faith attempts to perform the duties of
the office.”  Mont. Const. Initiative No. 98 (seeking to amend MONT. CONST. art. VII,
§ 12(4)); see also Mont. Sec’y of State, 2006 Ballot Issues, http://sos.mt.gov/ELB/
archives/2006/CI/CI-98.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).  The ballot initiative was chal-
lenged in litigation and rejected by the courts.  Chelsi Moy, Judge Throws Out Ballot
Initiatives, GREAT FALLS TRIB., Sept. 14, 2006, at 1A.
A Colorado ballot issue also proposed amending the Colorado Constitution to im-
pose term limits for its judges. See Colo. Sec’y of State, Proposed Initiative 2005-2006
#90, http://www.elections.colorado.gov/DDefault.aspx?tid=863&vmid=555 (last vis-
ited Feb. 11, 2007); see also Justice at Stake Campaign, Colorado – Term Limits for
Judges, http://www.justiceatstake.org/contentViewer.asp?breadcrumb=3,570,857,858
(last visited Feb. 11, 2007) (offering additional background on the proposed Colorado
amendment).  The proposal was rejected by the voters.  Howard Pankratz, 40: Cap-
ping Judges’ Tenure is Rejected, DENV. POST, Nov. 8, 2006, at B3, available at http://
www.denverpost.com/election/ci_4621511.
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the public.83  School curricula should be changed to include judicial
selection and emphasize the importance of an independent judici-
ary84 to children at an early age.85  One panelist recommended that
public forums be conducted statewide on judicial impartiality, judi-
cial selection, and judicial retention.86  “Broader public knowledge
of the role of the judiciary in enforcing individual constitutional
rights would instill an understanding that, while a person may not
agree with the result of any particular judicial decision, he or she
can rest assured that the rule of law will always be applied.”87
D. Selecting a Judicial Nominating Commission
Several panelists analyzed who should select the members of the
judicial nominating commission, not just who the commissioners
should be.  The commissioners should be selected by multiple enti-
ties to help ensure “that no one individual has control over the
commission or commissioners”88; preferably, the appointing au-
thority should not select commissioners.89  Two panelists stressed
that elected officials must be among the appointers, because their
political support is essential for the plan to be adopted and they
83. Jackson, supra note 34, at 132-36.
84. Feerick, supra note 1, at 12. R
85. See Harrison et al., supra note 9, at 262 (“Understanding this basic principle
will require pedagogy which starts in primary school and continues through secondary
school.”).
86. Irwin & Real, supra note 82, at 468-69. R
87. Kite, supra note 60, at 232.  In a speech at the Minnesota State Bar Conven- R
tion, Minnesota Chief Justice Russell Anderson stated:
A 1999 survey showed that four out of ten Minnesotans claimed to know
“little or nothing” about the courts.  Clearly, we can do a better job in ex-
plaining how the judicial branch protects citizens’ rights and liberties, and
how its nonmajoritarian structure is the genius of democratic design.  One
might not always agree with court decisions, but we should also be cognizant
of the reality that if you regularly put the rule of law to a popular vote, it
would cease to exist.
Anderson, supra note 20, at 23.  Panelist Donald Burnett warned that there was a R
cancer in America assaulting our constitutional republic and the concept of judicial
impartiality.  Donald L. Burnett, Jr., A Cancer on the Republic: The Assault upon
Impartiality of State Courts and the Challenge to Judicial Selection, 34 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 265, 265 (2007).  Dean Burnett also noted that “powerful economic and political
forces across the spectrum are now competing to control the composition of the
courts, in order to create a judiciary aligned with their special interests.” Id.
88. Colquitt, supra note 6, at 91. R
89. Id.; see also Burnett, supra note 87, at 283 (stating that “[a] nominating com-
mission can be independent and perceived as independent . . . only if a majority of its
membership is not determined by the judicial appointing authority or by any other
single source”).
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“theoretically, are accountable to the public.”90  One panelist
noted the principle of legitimacy would suggest that a “majority of
members [should] be appointed by persons [other than the ulti-
mate appointing authority] with ties to the democratic process,
rather than unelected special interests.”91  In this sense, legitimacy
“refers to the confidence of the public that the initial [judicial] se-
lection system itself comports with democratic principles.”92
Others noted that non-elected officials must be among those ap-
pointing the commissioners so that the process neither is nor ap-
pears to be “totally controlled by politicians.”93  But selecting the
non-elected appointers may be particularly difficult, especially in
determining which groups or organizations should be involved in
the selection.94  Two panelists referred to this problem as a “conun-
drum”95 and a “dilemma.”96  Although the panelists have not
found a “magic formula,” they note that as they gather more infor-
mation, they tweak their plan and try again.97
Finally, the lawyer members of the judicial nominating commis-
sion should represent different legal specialties, and there should
be party balance among them.98  It is important to have lay mem-
bers as well, because they “provide a valuable perspective on . . .
the integrity and human character of the applicants . . . .”99  Other-
wise stated, “some members of the nominating commission [must
90. Goodman & Marks, supra note 52, at 441. R
91. Jackson, supra note 34, at 159. R
92. Id. at 145; see also James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the U.S.
Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. 535, 537 (2003) (“Legitimate institutions are those with an authoritative mandate
to render judgements [sic] for the polity.”).
93. Goodman & Marks, supra note 52, at 442 (explaining that the lack of a role for R
non-political parties may create the appearance of complete political control).
94. Id. at 444.
95. Id. at 445.
96. Id. at 439; see also id. at 437 (“The problem is that everyone—from elected
officials to average people in focus groups—wants to know who will be appointing
members of the nominating commission, or, more colloquially, ‘who picks the pick-
ers.’”).  If one focuses on the organization and procedures of the commission, how-
ever, how the commissioners get there may be less important.  By way of analogy, it
may be difficult to ensure that education in a classroom is effective if we simply hire a
teacher for that classroom and tell her to do her best.  It would likely be more con-
structive to give a teacher a curriculum to follow and monitor her and her students’
performance as well.
97. Id. at 447.
98. See, e.g., Colquitt, supra note 6, at 95-98. R
99. Jackson, supra note 34, at 152. R
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be] regular folks—people who might end up in court as litigants,
witnesses, or jurors . . . .”100
E. Rules and Training of Judicial Nominating Commissions
Judicial nominating commissioners should be subject to rules
and procedures,101 “[y]et little attention is paid to these rules and
procedures, not only in academic studies of commissions, but in the
statutory and constitutional language that creates commissions.”102
Specifically, there should be a published code of conduct for com-
missioners, transparency as to what the commissioners do to facili-
tate discovery of violations and enforcement of the code of
conduct, and a means of enforcement against commissioners for
disregard of the code, including removal.
“Some commissions have remarkably sophisticated rules, while
others operate . . . with little to guide decision making
processes.”103  Some states have “[judicial] nominating proce-
dures . . . that are often informal and vary considerably from one
jurisdiction to the next.”104  These states lack procedures, for exam-
ple, on whether candidates should be interviewed, how many can-
didates should be interviewed and for how long, and what kinds of
questions should be asked.105  Such procedures are essential to the
work of the commission, namely to “evaluate applicants and de-
termine which applicants are best qualified”106 and find that
100. Goodman & Marks, supra note 52, at 433. R
101. Colquitt, supra note 6, at 99 (noting that “any commission should operate
under statutory directions, a code of conduct, and an oath” along with “a process for
enforcing the statutes and code”).
102. Caufield, Best Practices, supra note 52, at 186.  Professor Caufield added that R
some “commissioners make up the rules as they go.” Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 182-83.
105. Id.; see also generally id.  Steven Zeidman noted the problems of getting accu-
rate information on candidates through interviewing other attorneys: “I came to real-
ize that the legal community has its own pinstripe version of the police department’s
oft-noted ‘blue wall of silence.’  It was extremely uncommon for anyone to have any-
thing particularly critical to say.  In short order I came to more fully appreciate the
phrase ‘damning with faint praise.’”  Zeidman, Careful What You Wish For, supra
note 3, at 478. R
106. Caufield, Best Practices, supra note 52, at 190; see also Michael Sweeney, Panel
3 Remarks at the Fordham Law School Symposium: Rethinking Judicial Selection 64
(Apr. 7, 2006) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Sweeney, Panel 3 Remarks]
(stating that “[e]veryone who enters the selection process must know the criteria by
which they will be evaluated and they must know that everyone in the process will be
evaluated by the same criteria”).  Michael Sweeney is an Adjunct Professor at Ford-
ham Law School and Legal Counsel to the New York State Commission to Promote
Public Confidence in Judicial Elections.
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judge through active recruitment, not merely awaiting applica-
tions.107
A related subject panelists considered was the importance of
training judicial nominating commissioners and specifying their du-
ties.108  As one of the panelists noted, an “often overlooked ques-
tion” is “‘How do the pickers pick?’”109  It is not enough to ensure
the proper selection of commission members, but also to ensure
the proper functioning of the commission.  This is not a situation
best left to chance or improvisation.  “Good processes will yield
good decision-making, and working to implement the best set of
procedures will serve us well as an investment in the future of our
state judiciaries.”110
F. Confidentiality of Commission Proceedings
The panelists also considered the extent to which proceedings of
the commissions should be open.  One goal should be to avoid se-
crecy and the ensuing public distrust of secret processes.  “The
107. As Donald Burnett noted:
A commission should take steps to stimulate a broad array of applications,
rather than merely accepting passively whatever applications may be re-
ceived.  Indeed, given the importance of judicial appointments, it may not be
too much to suggest that nominating commissions should undertake profes-
sionalized search processes similar to those utilized by business organiza-
tions when hiring senior executives, or by academic institutions when hiring
senior administrators and tenure-track faculty members.
Burnett, supra note 89, at 286.
Searches for potential judges already are occurring, however, in political cir-
cles and among interest groups, whenever judicial vacancies appear.  Often,
these searches are conducted quietly, but thoroughly, by persons or interest
groups with a high stake in the outcome of judicial selections and a low re-
gard for the value of an impartial judiciary.  Ironically, the only stakeholders
not engaged in active searches are likely to be the members of the bench and
bar whose dominant interest is in an independent and impartial judiciary.
Id.
108. See id. at 285 (stating that members of nominating commissions should be
trained on “fair evaluative processes and on clear criteria” for nominations); Kite,
supra note 60, at 235 (“Furthermore, the effectiveness of the nominating commission R
could be increased by requiring formal training of new commission members.”);
Zeidman, Careful What You Wish For, supra note 3, at 479 (noting that the “informa- R
tion-gathering techniques [needed by judicial nominating commissioners] require
great training, skill, and time”); see also Caufield, Best Practices, supra note 52, at 181- R
82 (arguing that commission procedures and rules need to be thought about
carefully).
109. Caufield, Best Practices, supra note 52, at 182. R
110. Id. at 202; see also Burnett, supra note 89, at 287 (noting that a “neutral na- R
tional organization” should develop “a list of best practices” for appointive systems,
review the performance of appointive systems, publicize the quality of performance,
and offer assistance to states where necessary).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-1\FUJ103.txt unknown Seq: 26 12-APR-07 17:50
60 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
transparency of a system is important in garnering public trust for
the eventual result.”111  “Openness should bolster public sup-
port.”112  A panelist questioned the secrecy of her own state sys-
tem, noting “[t]he operation of the judicial nominating commission
should be more open to the public.”113  “In the absence of informa-
tion regarding proceedings, the public tends to think that the sys-
tem is ‘closed,’ and that judges are selected through ‘the old-boy
system’ or some other process that has little to do with the qualifi-
cations of the candidate.”114  Another cautioned against the prob-
lem of excessive openness driving away candidates and suggested
that “[w]hile the discussions of the nominating commission should
probably remain in confidence, the names of the finalists should be
publicized.”115
111. Jackson, supra note 34, at 157. R
112. Colquitt, supra note 6, at 109 (“Open proceedings allow a greater opportunity
for public input and enhance public confidence in the judicial selection system.”); see
also id. at 112 (“[A]t the very minimum, the names of the potential nominees, limited
biographical and professional information, and the final commission’s recommenda-
tions should be released to the public and the press.”).
113. Kite, supra note 60, at 234; see also Caufield, Best Practices, supra note 52, at R
198-99 (“[C]ommissions with the discretion to craft their own rules will often opt to
keep commission proceedings entirely confidential, thereby limiting public knowledge
of the process and the applicants.  This limits accountability and can undermine the
public’s confidence in the process.”).
Justice Kite elaborated on the concept of openness in her article:
[W]e should not, either as judges, attorneys, or judicial nominating commis-
sion members, fear sunshine in the process of selection of judges.  If we want
to guarantee the commission and the governor have the best possible infor-
mation on potential nominees, we must allow the public to know who those
nominees are and invite their input.  Attorneys who express an interest in
serving as a judge should not resist public scrutiny.  This change would re-
duce wide-spread misconceptions about outside influences and biases in the
selection of judges.
Kite, supra note 60, at 234 (footnote omitted). R
114. Jackson, supra note 34, at 157. R
115. Id. at 158.
There should also be transparency in the interview process, with the caveat
that there may be some tension at this stage between advancing the public’s
knowledge of the candidates and attracting quality candidates.  While trans-
parency would appear to suggest that interviews with the candidates be
made publicly available, [others point] out that to do so may inhibit the ef-
fectiveness of the interviews.  [They argue] that the commission should have
the ability to ask “hard questions,” which might cause problems for the com-
missioners or the candidates if made public.
Id.
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G. Review and Oversight for Commission Proceedings
A review process for judicial nominating commissions should be
established to ensure the fair operation of those commissions.116  In
her analysis of the English appointive system, one panelist de-
scribed an “independent watchdog entity, auditing the appoint-
ment process and investigating complaints about process and
fairness issues arising in specific appointments” and a successor
agency with a similar function.117  “[A]ny commission should oper-
ate under statutory directions, a code of conduct, and an oath.”118
Commissioners who violate the rules should be disciplined
“through an enforcement process.”119
The concept of oversight for the commission is natural to our
system.  The approach is essentially one of checks and balances.  A
judge’s decision is subject to review by another court, and if the
state has a two-level appellate structure, that court may be re-
viewed by still a higher appellate court.  Sometimes, there may be
additional federal court reviews.  We cannot be sure which court
made the correct decision, but our system trusts the safeguards of
hierarchical review, with one entity having the final word.
H. Diversity in Appointment Systems
The panelists recognized the importance of fostering diversity in
the appointive system.  “For an appointive system to be perceived
as legitimate, it must ensure that diversity is considered in nominat-
ing candidates and in appointing judges.”120  One panelist recom-
mended having a constitutional or statutory provision which
mandates that diversity be considered by the judicial nominating
commission.121  In order to maximize diversity in judicial appoint-
116. For suggestions of the safety valve of a judicial nominating review commission
to provide oversight over the judicial nominating commissions, see Greene, Perspec-
tives, supra note 45, at 968, and Greene, Model Appointive Selection Plan, supra note
45, at 604.
117. Judith L. Maute, English Reforms to Judicial Selection: Comparative Lessons
for American States?, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 387, 405 (2007).
118. Colquitt, supra note 6, at 99. R
119. Id. at 101.
120. Leo M. Romero, Enhancing Diversity in an Appointive System of Selecting
Judges, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 485, 485 (2007).
121. Id. at 487 (“Ensuring diversity is most likely to occur when the law establishing
the appointive system, whether in a constitution or statute, includes language that
mandates consideration of diversity.”).  Professor Romero suggested three ways to
ensure diversity:
[First, d]iversity language in constitutional provisions, legislation, or execu-
tive orders has the effect of valuing diversity and giving it the legal stamp of
approval.
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ments, however, one must also address the lack of diversity in the
profession.  “Efforts to diversify the bar are essential to diversify-
ing the bench, because the bar is the pool from which we select
judges.”122  Another panelist noted that “diversity must be de-
fined.”123  Choices include gender or racial diversity only, or “other
demographic, political, socioeconomic, geographic, or professional
differentiations.”124
Efforts at achieving diversity should also be measured.125  “The
nominating commission should also be directed to keep records re-
garding the diversity of its applicants, not only on the basis of race
or gender, but also on the basis of religion, background, geography,
and type of practice.”126
I. The Role of Judicial Discipline in Judicial Selection
A panelist explained the important role judicial discipline com-
missions might play in judicial selection and the obstacles to their
. . . .
A second way to ensure diversity, apart from constitutional and legislative
mandates or executive orders, would be to adopt rules of procedure that
enhance the selection of women and minorities to the nominating commis-
sions and increase the number of applicants from minority groups and
women.
. . . .
[Third], a conscientious commission and conscientious chair can implement
informal practices that further diversity.
Id. at 487-99; accord Jackson, supra note 34, at 141-45. R
Arizona requires consideration of diversity for nominating commission members
and judicial nominees. See Harrison et al., supra note 9, at 245. R
122. Sweeney, Panel 3 Remarks, supra note 106, at 60. R
123. Colquitt, supra note 6, at 96. R
124. Id.; see also Kite, supra note 60, at 221 (commenting that diversity includes R
variations in professional experience of candidates).  Justice Kite mentioned a Wyo-
ming poll in which some respondents were concerned that the judicial selection pro-
cess in Wyoming preferred attorneys with careers in private practice over government
attorneys. See Kite, supra note 60, at 221-22.  Whether or not the Wyoming poll is
valid, those concerned with optimum appointment systems need to be aware of how
to avoid biases against or in favor of any particular professional group.
125. Romero, supra note 120, at 496-97 (“Each commission should be required by
rule to keep records regarding the gender, race, and ethnic status of the commission
members, applicants for judicial positions, nominees, and judges appointed by the
governor.”).
[A] transparent process with required reporting of statistics regarding the
number of women and minorities on commissions, in the applicant pool, and
on the list of nominees provides a basis for measuring how well the appoin-
tive system has achieved diversity.
Id. at 497.
126. Jackson, supra note 34, at 160. R
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playing such a role.127  For example, some judicial discipline is con-
fidential, and confidential information may not be provided to ap-
pointing authorities absent a waiver of confidentiality by the
candidate.  Yet disciplinary information is precisely the type of in-
formation that a governor or other appointing authority should
have.  “Should not a governor [know] that a particular candidate
for judicial office had been issued three or four private reprimands
by an attorney or judicial disciplinary body?”128  The candidate
may refuse to provide a waiver, but according to a panelist, she
probably would not be appointed or rated qualified by a bar associ-
ation, even though voters in an elective system might still elect
her.129
J. The Reselection of Judges in Appointment Systems
Any judicial selection system—other than one with a single non-
renewable term which would certainly remove incentives to “curry
favor with those who control [judges’] continuation in office”130—
must provide for reselection of the judges.  Appointment systems
have two common forms of reselection: retention elections and
commission-based reappointments (where a commission does the
reappointing).  None of the panelists fully addressed commission-
based reappointments.131
In the New York Court of Appeals model, a judge whose term is
expiring applies to the judicial nominating commission for reap-
127. Judicial discipline as well as judicial performance evaluations are important
parts of an appointive selection plan. See Colo. Judicial Branch, Merit Selection of
Judges to Mark 40-year Anniversary in Colorado (Apr. 24, 2006), available at http://
www.coloradojudicialinstitute.org/downloads/40th%20Anniversary%20Jud%20Dept
%20PR.pdf (“The merit selection process as it now exists has three important compo-
nents.  The first establishes a nominating commission . . . . The second component of
merit selection is the Judicial Discipline Commission that oversees the conduct of
judges. . . . The third component of merit selection is the evaluation of judges.”).
128. Robert H. Tembeckjian, A Role for Disciplinary Agencies in the Judicial Selec-
tion Process, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 501, 504 (2007).
129. Id. at 508.
130. Tarr, supra note 72, at 311 (noting that the American Bar Association report, R
Justice in Jeopardy, endorsed single terms and that European constitutional courts use
them).
131. But see Jean E. Dubofsky, Judicial Performance Review: A Balance Between
Judicial Independence and Public Accountability, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 315
(2007) (arguing that a “performance commission might serve as a substitute for reten-
tion elections,” but noting it is unlikely that “periodic commission review” will replace
retention elections in Colorado).
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pointment.132  The judge has no advantage of incumbency, and
even if her performance was outstanding (however determined),
the commission will still report out multiple candidates’ names
from which the governor must select.133  The question is not
whether the incumbent did a good job, but whether the commis-
sion wishes to propose her name to the governor and the governor
chooses to select her.  Thus in 2006, New York Court of Appeals
Judge George Bundy Smith was not reselected by Governor
George Pataki, who had the right to select any of seven nominees
(including Judge Smith) for the Court of Appeals.134  Instead, Gov-
ernor Pataki selected Appellate Division, Fourth Department pre-
siding justice Eugene F. Pigott, Jr.135
132. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §2(c), (e); N.Y. Judiciary Law § 63(2)(b) (2006); see also
Am. Judicature Soc’y, Current Methods of Judicial Selection – New York, http://www.
ajs.org/js/NY_methods.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
133. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 63(3) (requiring that the report on the nominees be “re-
leased to the public by the [judicial nominating commission] at the time it is submitted
to the governor”); Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Merit Selection: Current Status
(2003), http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialMeritCharts.pdf (indicating that three to seven
names are submitted and that the names are made public).
134. In an ominous comment, a New York Times reporter stated that “several legal
experts said that [Judge Smith’s] prospects were harmed because of the decision he
wrote in 2004 striking down the state’s death penalty, angering the governor.”
Michael Cooper, With New Pick Pataki Puts Mark on Highest Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 2006, at A1.  If Judge Smith was “punished” for a death penalty decision by
Governor Pataki as indicated in the article, doing so would have contravened basic
principles of judicial independence.
135. Id.  Judge George Bundy Smith was appointed by Democratic Governor
Mario Cuomo. See Hon. George Bundy Smith – Biography, http://www.courts.state.
ny.us/ctapps/gbs.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).  His fourteen-year term was set to
expire in September 2006, and he faced mandatory retirement at age seventy at the
end of December 2007.  Born in 1937, at the time he sought to be reappointed, he was
sixty-nine years old and could have served only one more year if he were given a new
term. See Cooper, supra note 134, at A1.  Governor Pataki reportedly said that he did R
not reappoint Judge Smith for that reason.  The reappointment of Judge Smith would
have given the Governor’s successor, rather than Governor Pataki (since he did not
seek reelection in 2006), a chance to appoint Judge Smith’s replacement. See id.  Al-
though one might argue that Governor Pataki’s decision was reasonable, because
Judge Smith could only have served through 2007, this same problem could have de-
veloped if the incumbent had many more years to serve before retirement.  Specifi-
cally, under the New York system, the governor may unilaterally decline to appoint an
incumbent judge of a different party regardless of how many more years the judge has
to serve. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2(c), (e); N.Y. Judiciary Law § 63(2)(b); Am.
Judicature Soc’y, Current Methods of Judicial Selection – New York, supra note 132. R
In contrast, if Judge Smith had been up for reappointment in a state with an incum-
bent advantage (for instance, states with retention elections, such as Colorado or Ari-
zona, or states with types of commission-based reappointments unlike New York,
such as Hawaii or the District of Columbia), he may well have had a greater chance at
reselection. See infra notes 136-38.  He would not have faced the problem of needing R
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In Hawaii, a judge returns to the judicial selection commission,
which decides whether the judge should be retained.136  This leaves
the incumbent with some benefit of incumbency since the decision
over her retention is without reference to other applicants.137  The
District of Columbia also uses commission-based reappointment,
to be reappointed by a governor of a different party than the one who originally
appointed him from a number of equally situated applicants.
This raises questions: why was no incumbent advantage built into the New York
system, and what, if anything, should be done now to correct this? Should the New
York system now be viewed as one term of fourteen years, which is difficult to renew
regardless of the performance of the judge? See generally Hon. Stewart F. Hancock,
Jr., Letter to the Editor, Pataki Should Reappoint Smith to Appeals Court, THE POST
STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), Aug. 4, 2006, available at http://www.syracuse.com/
printer/printer.ssf?/base/opinion-1/1154682410165480.xml&coll=1 (requesting reap-
pointment of George Bundy Smith because of his quality and judicial independence,
and suggesting the adoption of presumptive reappointment).  The author of the letter,
himself a former New York Court of Appeals judge, asked:
[W]hen the judge has performed his or her judicial duties during the 14-year
term in an exemplary manner, should there not be a presumption that the
judge will be reappointed?  One may well ask: Why should not such a judge
be favored for reappointment over others who have had no experience at all
on the court?
Id.  The letter was co-signed by several distinguished New York attorneys, including
Professor John Feerick.  The use of the phrase “performed . . . in an exemplary man-
ner” is important, since no one should continue as an incumbent if he or she has
performed poorly.
The New York County Lawyers’ Association model plan has recommended that:
[R]eappointment of judges should be entirely determined by the judicial se-
lection panels [i.e., judicial nominating commissions] based on a review of
the judge’s performance on the bench, with no role for the elected ap-
pointing authority . . . . [T]his procedure essentially establishes a presump-
tion of continuation in office for a judge whose performance has met the
panel’s criteria.
ROADMAP TO REFORM, supra note 37, at 11. R
136. See HAW. CONST. art. VI, § 3; Am. Judicature Soc’y, Current Methods of Judi-
cial Selection - Hawaii, http://www.ajs.org/js/HI_methods.htm (last visited Feb. 11,
2007).  In Hawaii,
[j]udges must notify the commission within six months of the expiration of
their term that they plan to seek retention.  The commission solicits public
comment and interviews those who have had contact with the judge.  The
judge completes a questionnaire and is interviewed by the full commission.
A judge must receive at least five favorable votes to be retained.
Am. Judicature Soc’y, Current Methods of Judicial Selection – Hawaii, supra; see also
Lawrence S. Okinaga, Judicial Selection in Hawaii, HAW. B.J., July 10, 2006, at 100
(noting that Hawaii varies from other jurisdictions in that it not only selects, but also
retains, its judges through appointment by commission; in most other states, ap-
pointed judges renew their terms by running in retention elections unopposed).
137. One panelist, however, would not provide a benefit to incumbent judges, stat-
ing that,
Given the crucial nature of the judicial function, the ultimate question must
be whether there is anyone in the pool of available applicants who might
perform better . . . . [The question] sets an appropriately high standard for
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with some advantage of incumbency as well.  The judge is evalu-
ated by the Judicial Disabilities and Tenure Commission.  There
are three rating options—unqualified, qualified, or well-qualified.
The judge rated unqualified is not retained; the judge rated well-
qualified is retained; and if the judge is rated qualified, the Presi-
dent of the United States (the appointing authority) has the choice
whether or not to reappoint the judge.138
The symposium principally focused on retention elections, since
the panelists from appointive selection states who covered the sub-
ject also had retention elections, specifically Arizona, Colorado,
Kansas, Nebraska, and Wyoming.  The emphasis was on how those
retention elections functioned and how might they be improved.
Problems include low voter participation and lack of voter knowl-
edge of judicial performance.139  Significant percentages of voters
may be counted on to vote yes or no without any legitimate reason
for doing so, regardless of the performance of the judge standing
for retention.140
Improving voter knowledge is hampered by lack of available in-
formation about the judges seeking retention.  Information made
available to the public should be “quality information, addressing
as many aspects of judicial performance as possible in as much de-
tail as possible.”141  A judge should be evaluated not merely on her
competence but on her temperament.  “Judicial performance en-
tails both ‘competent’ discharge of judicial duties and ‘temperate’
discharge of judicial duties.”142
Retention elections also may occasionally be used by “special in-
terest groups . . . to further political agendas” when they are un-
happy with court decisions.143  An antidote might be “greater
[public] understanding of the importance of an independent judici-
such an important job, and signals . . . that we take seriously our obligation
to devise a system that produces only the best and brightest.
Zeidman, Careful What You Wish For, supra note 3, at 484. R
138. D.C. CODE § 1-204.33(c) (2006); see also Am. Judicature Soc’y, Current Meth-
ods of Judicial Selection - District of Columbia, http://www.ajs.org/js/DC_methods.htm
(last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
139. See Kite, supra note 60, at 218. R
140. See Irwin & Real, supra note 82, at 462. R
141. Id. at 471.  Justice Kite described Wyoming’s judicial evaluation poll as provid-
ing “some information about judges standing for retention,” but questioned the poll’s
reliability.  Kite, supra note 60, at 218. R
142. Irwin & Real, supra note 82, at 460. R
143. Id. at 465 (discussing the case of former Nebraska Supreme Court Justice
David Lanphier, who was not retained); see also Tarr, supra note 72, at 313 (noting R
that retention elections can share the “worst features of partisan elections,” but in-
cumbents are usually retained and “politicization is episodic”).
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ary which enforces the rule of law,” reducing the “chance of public
retaliation for unpopular decisions.”144
K. Judicial Performance Evaluations in Appointive Systems
“To enhance accountability, the system should have a mecha-
nism for independent evaluation of the judge’s performance, and
the public should be informed of the evaluation in advance of the
retention decision.”145  Sophisticated performance evaluation sys-
tems for judges standing for retention were recommended, such as
those used in Colorado,146 Arizona,147 and other states.148  Im-
provements may still be made.  For example, Colorado’s judicial
discipline commission has not been sharing information with the
state’s judicial performance evaluation commission.149  This de-
prives the evaluation commission of potentially crucial information
for its findings.  Few judges in Colorado receive “do not retain”
evaluations, and of those, only some are rejected by the voters.150
The same is true for Arizona, although some have retired rather
144. Kite, supra note 60, at 232. R
145. Jackson, supra note 34, at 160. R
146. For the description of the Colorado judicial performance program, see http://
www.cojudicialperformance.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
147. Arizona’s judicial performance review is required by its constitution, and it is
the only state with a constitutional mandate for such review. ARIZ. CONST. art. VI,
§ 42; Harrison et al., supra note 9, at 245; Am. Judicature Soc’y, Current Methods of R
Judicial Selection - Arizona, http://www.ajs.org/js/AZ_methods.htm (last visited Feb.
11, 2007).
148. Irwin & Real, supra note 82, at 470; Kite, supra note 60, at 236.  Jean Dubof- R
sky called Colorado’s system “the most sophisticated method in the nation for provid-
ing information to voters in judicial retention elections.”  Dubofsky, supra note 131, R
at 315. See also Harrison et al., supra note 9, at 253 (“[T]he [Arizona Judicial Per- R
formance Review] Commission surveys virtually everyone who has interacted with
the judge in his or her duties, including lawyers and judges’ staff, and, where applica-
ble, litigants, jurors, and witnesses. . . . [T]he [Judicial Performance Review] Commis-
sion gathers a wealth of pertinent information . . . .”); id. at 256 (“[T]he judicial
performance review process is an ongoing and searching inquiry that  rates the judge
on virtually all of his or her courtroom-related interactions.”).  Alan Tarr commented
that “[w]hichever system of reselection is employed,” a commission should “evaluate
the performance of incumbents while in office and . . . recommend for or against
retention.”  Tarr, supra note 72, at 313. See generally The Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, R
http://www.ncsconline.org/wc/CourTopics/statelinks.asp?id=46&topic=JudPer (last
visited Feb. 11, 2007) (list of and links to state judicial performance evaluation
programs).
149. See Dubofsky, supra note 131, at 334. R
150. Id. at 338.  If, however, the initial appointive system works well in selecting
quality judges, few might be expected to be rejected. Id.  To the same effect, see
Harrison et al., supra note 9, at  258 & n.131 (regarding Arizona’s appointive selection R
system).
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than seek retention in light of their poor evaluations.151  Arizona
voters likewise rarely vote not to retain a judge.152
Besides providing guidance for voters, judicial performance eval-
uation may also provide helpful feedback to a judge on her own
performance.  Colorado is about to commence interim evaluations
to provide judges with such information.153  Arizona already does
the same.154
L. Pre-Judicial Education—European Models
Some panelists considered the importance of education of judi-
cial aspirants before they become judges.  One stated that we
should consider “educational programs and credentialing systems
for judicial aspirants” or an “internship model” common for doc-
tors.155  Another noted the emphasis on pre-judicial training such
as in the Netherlands and other civil law countries.  For example, in
the Netherlands, one of two routes to the judiciary involves a six-
year program of judicial studies after a law degree, with an intern-
ship in various legal entities such as law firms, followed by an ex-
amination and psychological testing and assessment.156
151. See Harrison et al., supra note 9, at 257-58. R
152. See id. at 258.
153. See Dubofsky, supra note 131, at 336. R
154. See Harrison et al., supra note 9, at 255. R
[J]udges receive individualized evaluations through conference teams. . . .
[T]he teams meet with each judge annually and review his or her survey
results and self-evaluation.  The judge and team develop a self-improvement
plan for the judge. . . .  Judges agree that this process is invaluable to the
improvement of their judicial performance.  Few, if any, elected officials in
Arizona receive anything close to this type of tailored performance
evaluation . . . .
Id. (footnotes omitted).
155. Luke Bierman, Help Wanted: Is There a Better Way to Select Judges? 34 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 511, 524-25 (2007); see also Zeidman, Careful What You Wish For,
supra note 3, at 481-82 (suggesting “pre-judicial training, education, and certifica-
tion,” perhaps a “judicial studies graduate school,” and noting “training programs for
judicial aspirants” in other countries).
156. See Mary L. Volcansek, Appointing Judges the European Way, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 363, 374 (2007) (discussing training in civil law systems).  The civil service
model typically lacks prestige, and judges without practical experience may lack
“sympathy” for what is involved in running a law practice. Id. at 376.  The choice
need not be between pre-judicial education and lack of experience, however.  In a
model appointive selection system, commissions may seek out and approve candi-
dates with both education and experience.
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M. Empirical Research on Appointive Systems
One panelist analyzed numerous court opinions in order to at-
tempt to reach a conclusion on what type of appointive selection
system produces judges whose decisions exhibit the greatest degree
of judicial independence.157  He focused on criminal appeals and, in
particular, the extent to which the courts support the state in crimi-
nal cases.  His assumption was that a pro-defendant decision
(therefore a less popular decision) is indicative of judicial indepen-
dence and the reverse is not.158  “Although many other factors can
lead to the removal of a judge, a reputation for being ‘soft’ on
criminal defendants carries well-documented negative repercus-
sions.”159  “If a court’s judges are not concerned with the opinions
of those who could remove them from office, the hallmark of an
independent court, arguably that court should be more prone to
issue unpopular decisions, assuming all other factors are equal.”160
The panelist attempted to correlate the criminal justice decisions
that he studied with the manner in which judges were reselected
after the expiration of their terms.  He then sought to determine
whether systems with different reselection methods resulted in de-
cisions which reflected a greater or lesser degree of judicial inde-
pendence.  He recommended that additional research be
performed, which should use
analysis techniques to isolate the effects that these features
might have on how courts decide cases by controlling for other
factors that might affect the outcome of a case (such factors in-
clude the overall ideological complexion of the court, the facts
and the law at issue in the case, and the crime rate in the
state).161
Although the results of the research were not conclusive, one goal
of the symposium was to stimulate additional research—not just to
come up with answers.
Maximizing judicial independence may be only one of several
goals that we wish to achieve.  As a panelist noted, despite the
need for some independence, “the system should contain enough
157. Aman L. McLeod, A Comparison of the Criminal Appellate Decisions of Ap-
pointed State Supreme Courts: Insights, Questions, and Implications for Judicial Inde-
pendence, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343 (2007).
158. See id. at 348.
159. Id. at 349.
160. Id. at 348.
161. Id. at 362.  Professor McLeod found some of his results to date “counterintui-
tive” and “startling,” and rather than summarize them here, it would be best to review
his study in its entirety. Id. at 356.
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accountability that judges may be removed if their behavior in of-
fice demonstrates bias, a conscious disregard of the requirements
of the law, a lack of diligence, or a lack of civility.”162
CONCLUSION
The symposium focused on building a good system for selecting
judges; getting scholars and others with practical experience to talk
about what constitutes a good system; and stimulating research,
scholarship, and future symposia on the subject.  The goal is to de-
velop the best appointive system that may be designed.  A state
wishing to adopt an appointive plan need not resign itself to a plan
in effect in any particular state.  Instead, it may prefer to select the
plan to which that particular state aspires.  In addition, according
to two panelists, “[a] model merit selection plan is a good place to
start, but . . . [e]ach model must be adapted . . . so that it fits the
state or locality to which it will be applied.”163
The symposium also considered gathering support for the ap-
pointment process.  One panelist devoted a section of his article to
“Selling the Appointing Process,” regarding obtaining public sup-
port for a change from elections to appointments.164  Another men-
tioned attempts to undermine the appointive process in his state
and considered ways to preserve and defend the appointive sys-
tem.165  As one contributor to this symposium noted, “[r]eformers
need to engage their opponents and present reasoned arguments in
support of appointment.”166  Even beyond reasoned arguments,
however, supporters of appointments need to have good models to
demonstrate affirmatively what they propose, and this symposium
162. Jackson, supra note 34, at 136. R
163. Goodman & Marks, supra note 52, at 451; see also id. at 451-52 (noting the
need to learn more about the “cultural and political realities of the jurisdictions in
question” and that “[t]his learning process informs the development and revision of
merit selection proposals”).
164. Colquitt, supra note 6, at 122.  Political leadership seeking reform may also R
play a role. See Feerick, supra note 1, at 9 (recounting the New York Court of Ap- R
peals appointive selection plan developed in the 1970s: “In my opinion, the catalyst
for change was the governor at the time, Hugh Carey, who, in his campaign to be
governor, said to Cyrus Vance and other leaders of the bar that, if elected, he would
give strong leadership to change in the system.  He delivered on his promise.”).
165. See Harrison et al., supra note 9, at 250 (“The efforts to undermine or elimi- R
nate the appointive system continue unabated in Arizona because special interests
have apparently concluded that those interests are not best served by independent,
impartial judges.”).  The authors suggest methods to support appointive selection in
Arizona, including providing more information to the public on the operation of the
nomination process and judicial performance review. Id. at 251-54.
166. Tarr, supra note 72, at 294. R
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provided an opportunity to analyze and construct them.  As a con-
tributor commented in an understatement, “regardless of one’s ul-
timate views on the merits of appointment versus election, [this]
Symposium is certainly timely.”167
SYMPOSIUM ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
As the organizer of this symposium, I recognize how much the
symposium owes to the following:
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— As the funders of a symposium with many out-of-state speak-
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— Fordham Law School; and, in particular, Dean William
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model and mentor for many reformers; The Louis Stein Center for
Law and Ethics at Fordham Law School, which sponsored the sym-
posium, and its director Professor Bruce A. Green, for his counsel
and support throughout; and Fordham’s excellent conference staff,
including Director of Academic Programs and Continuing Legal
Education Helen Herman, and Assistant Director Darin Neely, to-
gether with David Quiles, Angela Belsole, and Fordham’s commu-
nications department.
— The Fordham Urban Law Journal for agreeing to publish the
many articles from the symposium in a special issue and for the
assistance of its editors, including Vivian Lam, editor-in-chief,
Kimberlee Tangorra, managing editor, and my articles editor,
Genevieve Blake.  Based upon much experience in producing sym-
posia, I am well aware that it is often the publication that lasts.
— My other sponsors, who have long been dedicated to the im-
provement of American democracy and believed in this project,
including the American Judicature Society (Rachel Paine Cau-
field), the League of Women Voters of New York State Education
167. Id.
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Foundation (then Executive Director Rob Marchiony and Lenore
Banks), the Constitution Project (Virginia Sloan and Kathryn
Monroe), and The Fund for Modern Courts (Victor Kovner and
Dennis Hawkins).
— John Caher, who until recently led the Albany Bureau of the
New York Law Journal, and who has left for a position in Governor
Spitzer’s administration.  His articles on judicial selection appeared
regularly in the Law Journal, and for anyone who wanted to know
what was happening in the field, his articles were compulsory
reading.
— Those who attended the symposium, including the sizeable
number who came from outside New York State.
Finally, I would like to recognize all those who understand the
importance to our democracy of justice, impartiality, and the rule
of law.
